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GEORGE ELIOT'S MIDDLEMARCH AS A TRANSLATION OF SPINOZA'S
ETHICS
By Miriam Henson

In 1846 John Chapman of Newgate Street published a translation of David Strauss's Das Leben
Jesu. Although no translator was accredited, this book was the result of two years' arduous
work by Mary Ann Evans, the woman who would later achieve renown as George Eliot.
Strauss's presentation of Jesus is that of a historical figure; he denies his divine status, and
suggests that the miracles written about in the Gospels are mythic in nature. Although Mary
Ann was distressed by Strauss's destruction of all the 'miraculous and highly improbable'
elements of the Gospel, she too had, for some time, been unable to regard Jesus as the Son of
God; after reading Charles Hennell'sAn Enquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity in 1838
she suffered a loss of faith and ceased her church attendance in 1842.1 The religious and
scientific climates of the period were changing: by 1842 Mary Ann had read the work of the
geologist Charles Lyell and, ten years later, Herbert Spencer presented his theory of evolution
in the Westminster Review under her management; elements of each anticipated Charles
Darwin's The Origin of Species of 1859. Although the change occurred gradually, the
increasing secularization of intellectual thought, and the lack of a divinely endorsed role
model, placed the nature of morality under scrutiny.
Mary Ann translated two further philosophical texts which could be considered to offer
alternative systems of morality: Ludwig Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity and Benedict
de Spinoza's Ethics, both of which reject the idea of a Judaeo-Christian creator god:
Feuerbach's 'god' is a projected ideal of human nature, whereas Spinoza's equivalent is
immanent in all substance. Both writers influenced her fiction, but it is especially interesting to
consider her relationship with Spinoza as she became convinced that a simple translation was
not sufficient to make his ideas available:
What is wanted in English is not a translation of Spinoza's works, but a true
estimation of his life and system. After one has rendered his Latin faithfully
into English, one feels that there is another yet more difficult process of
translation for the reader to effect, and that the only mode of making Spinoza
accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then shut them and give an
analysis. (Letters, 1,321)
Hilda M. Hulme believes that she effects this analysis through her literature and that her
acknowledged masterpiece Middlemarch is such a 'process of translation'.2 It is certainly
noteworthy that it was the very year Mary Ann finished translating the Ethics that she turned
to writing fiction. This raises the question of the capabilities of fiction for moral education: is
it the case that Middlemarch is 'a true estimation' of Spinoza's system of morality, and why did
Eliot choose to write a novel rather than a philosophical treatise of her own?
The disappearance of an absolute ethical role model cast doubt over the concept of an objective
morality external to humanity, or even external to the individual. Spinoza's presentation of
what we call 'good' and 'evil' is highly subjective: 'there is nothing in a natural state which is
by common consent good or bad, since every man in a natural state consults his own advantage
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alone'.3 Eliot's views in Middlemarch resonate with this as she presents a view oflife restricted
by the ego. Almost all of the characters' greatest failings stem from their inability to see beyond
the narrow horizon of the self, which is illustrated through the metaphor of the pier-glass:
Your pier-glass ... will be minutely and multitudinously scratched in all
directions; but place now against it a lighted candle as a centre of illumination,
and lot the scratches will seem to arrange themselves in a fine series of
concentric circles round that little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are
going everywhere impartially and it is only your candle which produces the
flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light falling with an
exclusive optical selection. These things are a parable. The scratches are
events, and the candle is the egoism of any person now absent. 4
Although this does not exclude the possibility of objective truth, the subjectivity of experience
makes it inconceivable that such knowledge could ever be fully discoverable.
Spinoza states that 'Every thing ... strives to persevere in its existence' (Ethics, p. 100); if this
is the presiding rule in life then it is difficult to see how such an egotistical world could avoid
leading to moral depravity through selfishness. Spinoza's explanation as to why this does not
occur rests on the human faculties of identification and imagination. This is an area in which
George Eliot regards literature as playing a vital role: her digressive chapter in Adam Bede, 'In
Which the Story Pauses a Little' , is a fervent appeal for people to relate to their fellow-men:
'It is these people - amongst whom your life is passed - that it is needful you should tolerate,
pity, and love' and realistic fiction helps promote this ideal. 5 The ability to empathize was a
quality much prized by Eliot and she believed that orthodox religion needed to be replaced by
'a more deeply-awing sense of responsibility to man, springing from sympathy with ... the
difficulty of the human lot' (Letters, V, 31). Spinoza describes the working of empathy: 'From
the fact that we imagine a being similar to ourselves ... to be affected with some emotion, we
shall be affected with a like emotion ... therefore we strive to set the being we pity free from
suffering' (Ethics, pp. 112-13). What is to be cultivated is the ability of the mind to recognize
another as having desires and sorrows that are similar to, but at the same time separate from,
one's own. Martha Nussbaum considers the potential, and indeed the necessity, for certain
kinds of philosophy to be expressed through literature:
The telling itself - the selection of genre, formal structures, sentences,
vocabulary, of the whole manner of addressing the reader's sense of life - all
of this expresses a sense of life and value, a sense of what matters and what
does not. 6
Eliot's frequent narrative identification with the reader through the use of the pronoun 'we',
and direct appeals to the reader's compassion by outlining the perspectives of different
characters, actively encourage the identification and imagination necessary for empathy.
In spite of this seeming agreement, Eliot and Spinoza's views then diverge. For Spinoza,
'Compassion in a man who lives according to reason, is in itself evil and useless ... the good
which we do ... we desire to so solely in obedience to the dictate of reason' (Ethics, pp. 19091). For Eliot, conversely, feeling is imperative, and altruism that is purely academic or that
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originates from a sense of duty but no affection is not seen as desirable; both Casaubon's
treatment of Will and Bulstrode's attempts to make amends are portrayed in this way, and it is
significant that Will eventually refuses to accept either man's offer. Eliot does agree with
Spinoza that reason is of vital importance, although 'reason' for Eliot equates to a more general
intellectual self-awareness than Spinoza's rigorous logic. Indeed, a blend of the two is
necessary:
'To be a poet is to have ... a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously
into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge .... '
'But you leave out the poems,' said Dorothea. (Middlemarch, p. 217)
The chiastic presentation of 'knowledge' and 'feeling' leads Dorothea to anticipate the lesson
she will have to learn about life and love: both feeling and consciousness are essential. It is not
possible to become a poet by virtue of feeling alone: one must also have the intellectual ability
to enable the writing of poems. Poetry is feeling become self-aware; it requires a functioning
rational capacity. Bernard Paris refers this to the idea of empathy, and suggests that it has an
important role to play: 'Consciousness is the primary source of the moral order; it produces that
awareness of species, of others as different from yet like ourselves, which is the basis of all
ethical action.'7 Nussbaum similarly considers 'perception', both of one's self and of 'the
salient features of one's particular situation' to be an essential moral faculty, and describes it as
being 'built into the very form of the novel as a genre' (Nussbaum, p. 37). Reading a novel, an
intellectual process in itself, is an ideal means of encouraging rational consideration of
emotion.
Certainly, as Spinoza states, an excess of feeling can be dangerous. George Levine suggests
that in Eliot's work a true knowledge of the world can only be gained through a complete
annihilation of self: 'clear vision requires selflessness' ,8 and he quotes this passage from
Middlemarch: 'If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like
hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies
on the other side of silence' (Middlemarch, p.189). This is perhaps a perverted empathy: one
in which identification takes place not with other rational beings, but with life itself and, as a
result, one's sense of self is entirely absorbed. It indicates that it is possible to empathize too
much: is this the case with Dorothea? It is certainly one interpretation of her pity for Casaubon,
and her willingness to devote her life to him. However, Eliot makes it clear that, despite her
generosity of spirit, Dorothea's view of her marriage is ultimately egocentric:
[I]t had been easier for her to imagine how she would devote herself to Mr.
Casaubon, and become wise and strong in his strength and wisdom, than to
conceive with that distinctness which is no longer reflection but feeling ... that
he had an equivalent centre of self. (Middlemarch, p. 205)
'Reflection' is fused with 'feeling' in a complex interplay. 'Feeling' is foregrounded: Dorothea
needs to have a direct emotional connection with Casaubon, rather than a purely academic
understanding of his 'equivalent centre of self'. The word 'equivalent' is significant, reminding
us that it is the connection between the two which is important; it is not until Dorothea has a
proper understanding of her own 'centre of self', for which she needs to cultivate selfreflection, that she will be able to identify it in others.
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The desire to avoid selfishness can be so strong that it is easy to underestimate the importance
of self in empathetic relations and the functioning of society as a whole. Is complete
selflessness possible? Eliot demonstrates that, no matter how philanthropic one is, one can
never be altruistically selfless. Most people derive some self-satisfaction from helping others:
'[Dorothea's] mind had glanced over the possibility, which she would have preferred, of
finding that her home would be in a parish which had a larger share of the world's misery, so
that she might have had more active duties in it' (Middlemarch, pp. 76-77). Eliot had first-hand
experience of another form of self-interested altruism as she devoted her life to caring for her
father through his last years. She writes: 'We are apt to complain of the weight of duty, but
when it is taken from us, and we are left at liberty to choose for ourselves, we find that the old
life was the easier one' (Letters, I, 334). Self-sacrifice is escapism: it allows one to repress
problematic aspects of one's character, and to avoid the necessity of making difficult choices.
This is shown through Maggie's plight in The Mill on the Floss. After reading Thomas a
Kempis she experiences a period of renunciation during which, although she feels herself to be
satisfied, 'one has a sense of uneasiness in looking at her, - a sense of opposing elements, of
which a fierce collision is imminent', suggesting that her previous character is dormant rather
than defeated. 9 Her sacrifice enables her to evade making difficult jUdgements, and to dismiss
the intense emotion that is so problematic: 'Our life is determined for us; and it makes the mind
very free when we give up wishing, and only think of bearing what is laid upon us, and doing
what is given us to do' (The Mill on the Floss, p. 314). Even if it were possible entirely to
subjugate the self to something other, would it be desirable? Altruism requires engagement
between the self and other, and this can only be fulfilled effectively if a sense of self is
preserved. David Carroll writes of Dinah in Adam Bede: 'She had been called to minister to
others, not to have any joys or sorrows of her own (I. 48); but ... this makes reciprocal relations
impossible. '10 As Mrs Poyser observes, 'if you loved your neighbour no better nor you do
yourself, Dinah, it's little enough you'd do for him. You'd be thinking he might do well enough
on a half-empty stomach'; this suggests that healthy self-regard is essential in order to
empathize fully (Adam Bede, p. 190).
As we have seen, self-fulfilment can never derive entirely from self-abnegation. As Hulme
notes, Spinoza places particular emphasis on the importance of self-knowledge: 'It is selfknowledge, to be gained through the exercise of the human intellect, which will give them
liberty' (Hulme, p.119). For Spinoza this is the only way to gain partial freedom from the
determinism of life: 'men believe themselves free solely because they are conscious of their
actions and ignorant of the causes by which they are determined' (Ethics, p. 97). The rational
capacity of thought, including the ability to acknowledge one's physical determinism, is the
nearest we can get to freedom. Dorothea's freedom comes from her decision to withhold her
unmitigated compliance with Casaubon's wishes. When Casaubon asks her to promise to
continue his work she finally, albeit privately, agrees. This is her first complete act of selfabnegation as it is entirely against her inclination: she neither believes it to be conducive to her
happiness nor in service of the greater good. However, she is saved from this fate as she
chooses to consider the decision; rather than unthinkingly submitting she requests time to
reflect and Casaubon dies before she has a chance to answer. Her further decision not to
continue the work is problematic, as, having resolved to do so, it might seem that she is
recoiling from something which she previously considered to be the morally correct action.
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However this is further indication of the importance of the empathetic relationship between
people. Dorothea's decision to say yes relies upon her wish to avoid hurting her husband: she
has discovered that the work has no intrinsic value of its own, and therefore, once she does not
stand to injure someone's feelings, she does not feel bound to complete it.
Self-knowledge requires introspection and self-reflection but it cannot be achieved by these
alone; it necessarily requires interaction with others. The desire to live up to the expectations
of others is something that Spinoza notes: 'We try to do that which we imagine men will look
at with pleasure, and on the contrary, we are averse to do that for which we imagine they will
dislike' (Ethics, p. 85). Whilst obviously true on a superficial level, this does not allow for
people who like to fly in the face of public opinion as Wtll does, for example. Although he
does not act in this way simply to be antagonistic he does relish the idea of being
unconventional, and while Eliot mocks him for his delusions of grandeur, her tone is
affectionate. However, what Eliot realizes is that this fear of judgement is only present when
either the subsequent retribution is likely to be severely disadvantageous, or one has a
connection (through identification or projection of one's own ideals) with the person or
community passing judgement. This is why, for a long time, Dorothea is so anxious to live up
to Casaubon's expectations, as he is, at this point, an embodiment of her own ideals. Similarly,
whilst Rosamond becomes quickly disillusioned with Lydgate, and therefore disregards his
expectations of her, she is hurt bitterly by the revelation that Will (whom she considers,
mistakenly, to be something of a soul-mate) thinks badly of her.
Community expectation may also shape individual consciousness, thus playing a part in
Spinoza's determinism. As George Levine says of Daniel Deronda, 'the source of both shame
and fear is the possible exposure to communal observation and consequent judgment' and this
is true of all Eliot's communities: for example, it is the force which Maggie so resents during
her childhood and which devastates her adult life (Levine, p. 226). This is unsurprising as
societal norms and communal judgement impacted so greatly on Eliot's own life following her
decision to co-habit with Lewes. As a result, much of her fiction is involved with the difficulty
in reconciling a personal and a communal morality. Many critics have commented that the
emphasis on the importance of societal opinion and the complex and symbiotic relationship
between the individual and the community is indicative of Eliot's interest in evolution and the
organic nature of society. Sally Shuttleworth notes that descriptions of characters are frequently
presented from the perspectives of others: the fact that Dorothea 'was usually spoken of as
being remarkably clever', and Mr Brooke 'was held in this part of the county to have
contracted a too rambling habit of mind', indicates that 'Character cannot be defined apart from
social opinion, for each individual is only the sum of his, constantly changing, relations with
the social organism.' Shuttleworth continues, 'Such relativism, however, is more apparent than
real; it is clearly undercut by the text's claim to offer authoritative judgement.'ll However,
although the text may indicate that there is an objective truth, this is portrayed as in keeping
with the pier-glass metaphor: if there is an objective truth it is impossible for the reader to
locate, limited, as we are, by interpretation. Eliot ironically draws attention to this in her
comment on the subjectivity of experience: 'The text, whether of prophet or of poet, expands
for whatever we can put into it, and even his bad grammar is sublime' (Middlemarch, p. 50).
In any case, the narrator draws back from making any kind of definitive moral judgement about
the actions of characters. This then encourages interpretation on the part of the reader, and
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demonstrates one of the key advantages Nussbaum believes fiction offers for moral education:
'novels are more open-ended, showing the reader what it is to search for the appropriate
description and why that search matters' (Nussbaum, p. 47).
In effect, this 'authoritative judgement' of which Shuttleworth speaks is really no more than an
awareness of the complex inter-relationships of character and community. This creates a
difficulty: if individuals are determined by society and the morality of society is made up of an
amalgamation of these individuals' beliefs, then how is society ever to change or develop? Eliot
makes it clear that anomalous and unconventional individuals are necessary for societal reform,
through the representation of change instigated by outsiders such as Dorothea, Ladislaw and
Lydgate. In Darwinian terms, the unusual individuals are the catalysts for wider change, and the
challenge posed, through conflict and competition, is necessary for progress. However, this
challenge cannot be revolutionary. Eliot was at the cutting edge of contemporary thought,
publishing new and challenging philosophical, scientific and theological theories in the
Westminster Review, but, as Kathryn Hughes notes, 'Social change must come gradually ...
Revolution, liberation and upheaval were to have no place in Mary Ann's moral world.'12 We
can see evidence for this in the finale of Middlemarch, in what George Levine describes as 'a
hymn to gradualism' (Levine, p. 256).
[T]he effect of [Dorothea's) being on those around her was incalculably
diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric
acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is
half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited
tombs. (p. 795)
Dorothea Barrett reads the ending much less optimistically: 'the relinquishing of vocation and
the settling for something un spectacular but comfortable that we feel brooding beneath the
surface ... suggest an ending neither happy nor tragic, but simply disappointing and
mundane,.13 However, what looks like a disappointing compromise can often be the synthesis
of a dialectical process. In her elucidation of Eliot's attitude to social change, Hughes quotes
from the prospectus for the Westminster Review:
Sharp scrutiny of 'established creeds and systems' would, it was maintained,
lead not to their destruction but to their re-emergence in a stronger, refined
form ... 'opposing systems may in the end prove complements of each other' .14
This is closely connected to Eliot's insistence that change must come from within, as
demonstrated, for example, by Will's reluctance to use direct attacks against the systems that he
wishes to change. In addition, the very positive message presented by the finale is that small
changes go on to affect the world exponentially.
In any case, it is the endless process itself which is important. Will is a physical embodiment of
this process: he is described as being in a state of constant flux. The narrator describes him using
the vocabulary of change, often evoking water: 'the little ripple in his nose was a preparation
for metamorphosis' (Middlemarch, p. 203). Shuttleworth also notes this: 'Will ... is concerned
less with origins than with the vital organic processes of historical growth; he would "prefer not
to know the sources of the Nile" [(Middlemarch, p. 80))' (Shuttleworth, p. 165). From this we
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can infer that it is much less important to concern oneself with the origins of morality: more
significant is what one does with the moral capacities one possesses. This reflects the
development of Eliot's attitudes towards religion. Despite her loss of faith and her dramatic
renunciation of the church, as she grew older she developed a tolerance for religion, and
recognized that it can be a helpful guiding principle. However, it is still the practicality of what
this can achieve which is important. For Eliot, prayer has no function other than to improve the
moral nature of the person praying, and it is his or her subsequent actions that are praiseworthy:
morality is in the process of striving for altruistic ideals, whether or not the ideals themselves
are true and substantive, or illusory, or projected. This is not to suggest that pursuing pointless
chimerical ideals is something to be encouraged, rather it allows the possibility that principles
which cannot be proved by reason may still be essential for the cultivation of an ethical
attitude. Paris suggests that 'Sentiment saves existence from absurdity, for it hallows and
sanctifies that which reason finds meaningless or relative. Sentiment moves us to acts of
goodness, of unselfishness, of reverence, for which reason provides no motivation or
rationale'; if we came to the conclusion that all our ideals were unobtainable, and stopped
feeling (despite what we might rationally believe) that some intrinsic meaning exists in the
world it would be easy to slip into a state of nihilism, solipsism and apathy (Paris, p. 64). So,
as Paris states: 'Christianity, then, is not the source of the moral order for George Eliot, but, as
a form of organized experience, it is certainly an important part of the ethical process' (Paris,
p.63).
The importance of process for Eliot is in accordance with Spinoza's thoughts about analysis
and active thought. He states: 'the more [a being] acts the more perfect it is' (Ethics, p. 240),
and makes a distinction between ideas and other kinds of thoughts: 'an idea involves an
affirmation or negation ... an idea, since it is a mode of thought, consists neither in the image
of anything nor in words' (Ethics, pp. 85-86). This is connected to issues of choice and the selfawareness of our conscious thought which constitutes Spinoza's freedom and self-knowledge.
The conclusion that arises is that morality is not a list of rules and regulations; it is about the
active choices that one makes. Gillian Beer notes that in Daniel Deronda 'Mordecai ends by
claiming that the strongest principle of growth lies in human choice: "The divine principle of
our race is action, choice, resolved memory. ">15 This can be seen through the emphasis that
Eliot places on life-changing decisions. Eliot's novels hang entirely around these key points:
Dorothea's decision not to continue Casaubon's work, Mary's decision not to bum
Featherstone's will, Gwendolen's decision to marry Grandcourt, Gwendolen's decision to let
Grandcourt drown, Maggie's decision not to marry Stephen, Tito's decision not to search for
his father, and so on.
Hulme argues:
If George Eliot feels that any correction is necessary in Spinoza's system ... it
seems likely that she wishes to avoid any apparent overemphasis on the
importance of 'active thought' ... one whose mind is quite untrained to active
thought, may yet act rightly through an inspired energy of feeling. (Hulme,
p. 124)
However, Hulme confuses 'active thought' with the kinds of reason and intellect which require
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formal education. Paris describes his own version of 'active thought':
Lack of intelligence is also an obstacle to sympathy .... A sympathetic feeling
is one which is excited by the signs of that feeling in another person;
intelligence, that is, mental vision, is needed to read the signs .... Sympathy
and vision are both dependent on experience. Unless we have had an
experience much like that which another person is undergoing, we cannot
perceive and share the states of feeling signified by that person's behaviour.
(Paris, p. 68)
The definitions are slippery; 'intelligence' has nothing to do with the kind of education one
receives in a schoolroom or from a philosophical treatise, but has everything to do with the
moral education that comes from 'experience'. The importance of active thought is the reason
why Eliot chooses to write a novel as an 'analysis' of Spinoza; it is something that cannot be
achieved by 'words' or 'images' alone but has to involve feeling and self-awareness. Reading
is a creative process, requiring readers to utilise their imaginative and empathetic faculties, and
in this respect it develops their capacities for moral judgement. Rather than being didactic, it
relies on identification in order to gain understanding; as Dorothea says to Celia, 'No, dear, you
would have to feel with me, else you would never know' (Middlemarch, p. 781). This is
something that Eliot discusses at length in her essay 'The Natural History of German Life':
Appeals founded on generalisations and statistics require a sympathy readymade ... but a picture of human life such as a great artist can give, surprises
even the trivial and the selfish into that attention to what is apart from
themselves. 16
In Eliot's opinion, a 'great artist' is one who can use 'words' and 'images' to provoke feeling
and reflection, thus leading to increased understanding.
It is in this respect that Eliot and Spinoza have different emphases: Eliot chooses to encourage
a compassion based on feeling, rather than that exercised by Spinoza's ideal rational man.
However, even the fact that she challenges some of these issues further fulfils Spinoza's
system: it is the progress that comes from such challenges that constitutes his ideal of active
thought. In any case, the importance of feeling is in accordance with Spinoza's system as a
whole. One of the ways in which Spinoza differed from the Stoical writings of his
contemporaries is that he allows for its presence, and even necessity. He writes about religion
and morality: 'Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself; and we do not delight
in it because we conquer our passions, but because we delight in it, we are able to conquer our
passions' (Ethics, p. 242). This is why complete selflessness cannot be desirable: enjoyment of
moral activity is an essential part of wisdom; it is in this way that Eliot gives a 'true estimation'
of Spinoza's system, and the reason why she writes a novel. Middlemarch achieves what the
Ethics never can; written in the style of a scientific or mathematical proof, the Ethics may
advocate feeling, but it does not embody it. It is the way Eliot excites our emotions and makes
us connect with her characters, combined with the necessary analytical and intellectual attitude
from the reader, that develops our empathetic capacities and improves our understanding, both
of ourselves and of our fellow-men with whom we share a common bond of consciousness.
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